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The jury returned a verdict of guilty for both Ms. i'vfoskios ;rnd :Ms. Martindale. 
At trial, certain facts came to iight the two female co-defendants ·..vere the 
signifi cant others of the tw o male co-defendants. who were brothers. l\1s Moskios and 
Carlos Pinto were residences of Ore2:on 2. t the tinw or the nlleged offense. while Ms 
~ ~ , 
Martindale and Brian Pinto lived together iJ1 Idaho The two male co-defondants had a 
relationship \,vhich :nvolved illegal sales of marijuana, in the transport to each other and in 
the sales to other individuals Ms. 1\/foskios was in a vehicle dri ven by !Vlr Carlos Pinto 
which contained a large quantity of marijw1na (2 l pounds transported in the car of rvis 
Moskios, while i 8 pounds \\ ~re fo und in the home of J\ fs . fartindaleJ whi le on a trip 
from central Oregon to fdaho v,-i th their chil d in the vehicic, on December l 0th, 2009 Ms 
Martindale was living in a home \\itb Brian Pinto where the rna rijuana \.1,· as brought to and 
held 
The t rial was not li mited to the facts of the event:' on December !IJ°', 2009, and for 
various reasons testimony centered upon the history of dmg dealing between the t,,,vo men, 
and the amounts of money earned and assets owned by the respective couples. The 
ul timate question in the tria! was the knowledge, and ultimately actual or constnictive 
possession of the marij uana by the respective females, and thi s was shown through 
testimony regarding the facts surrounding their respective circumstances, not much of 
which was similar or coincided ·.vith each-other, resuiting in a confusion of issues and lack 
of organization to the cases. 
2 
\\ 
certa1n 
to ' vame 
(See Transcript of Jury Trial. da" l, at page 63 ) The evich:'nce which the Stnt e sought 10 
admit was concerning k11\J \ \ ledge or part ic ip:n ion in otb -r drug deali ng or trans.-ictions 
that had allegedly taken place involving t he codefendants. in th,..; case who had already 
entered guilty pleas at the time of the trial for the Jbove named appe!laJ1t Essenti ally, the 
State sought to admit evicfonce that the above- named Appellant, !\'ls JVl oskios. and her 
codefendant had participated in sc1111e way in prio r dm g tr~in sactions, or that they had 
previously possessed drngs, for the purpose of dea ling and profited fron.1 it. The State 
I argued such evidence was reievant as an except io n to LR E 404 (b) in that it showed 
intent to possess the drugs at issue in the present case. (See Transcri pt of Jury Triai, day I, 
at 67.) 
f:fo y1/ever. the Judge at tr:a! n: led cli.:arly that he would not allow in any of the 
aforementioned evidence, un less it ,vas for the purpose of rebuttal or impeachment, due to 
its prejud icial effect and, due to a lack of direct r,Jcvance to the cri me charged, stating on 
the record that , "because of the fact that the defendant is not charged with being pa1i of 
the business in this particular case or. A financial interest in the sell ing of the 
I 
Thus., the court made clear thctt no evidence wa. to be admissible that was not 
directly related to the charge at hand, namely. the possession of the particular marijuana 
the defendant/appellant was alleged to have possessed on that day The counsel on appeal 
alleges that this was, in fact the correct ruling on the issue . Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts is not admissibie to prove the chara cter of a person to show action in 
conformity therew ith. I.RE 404 (b); Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P 3d at 283. It is well 
settled law that in order to be admissible, such evidence must fall into a permissible 
-f. 
I 
I 
I 
purpose, such as proof of morive, opportun ity, inlen1. preparn tfo n, identity, or a general 
pian . See Stole l '. Kremer,, 160 P.3d 443 (2007j It is incu mbent upon the state to show 
hmv th.i s evidence is permissible, and is not merely character evidence In thi:,. case, the 
State argued that evidence ought to be admi ssibie to show that the defendant intended to 
posSPSS the marijuana, an element of the offense. 
Idaho couns taking a look at evidence such a th.is in recent rulings have held that. 
"triai cour1s must carefully 5crutin.iz~ evidence offered a.s ··corroboration" or as 
de.monstra ting a ''co n moo scheme or plan" in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of 
evidence that i merely probativ of the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal 
behavi0r" State "· Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P 3d at 1185 (2009) It is the defendant' s 
positi n that allovving in evidence of the appellams ' knowledge and/or participation of 
prior drug transactions, or their profit therefrom was not relevant to sho · their intent to 
possess the part icular drugs alleged in this in tance, and that any such evi dence would be 
unduly prejudicai and tending to show mere propensity, ·which is prohibited, and that 
therefore, the Judge's ruling on the i ·sue was con ect. The a!le ed evidence sought to be 
admitted, was not charged conduct, but presumably the allegations of other witnesses 
regarding what the defendant/appellants knew or participated in as far as drng activities on 
prior occasions. "Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to 
I R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to 
der:.1onstrate the defendant' s propensity to engage in such behavior ,- Id 1n order to be 
admissible evidence uncl er r. R. E 4C!..\- (b )., the prior bad act must a1so be "relevant to a 
material disputed issue to d1e crime charged, other than propensity " State v. Pokorney, 
149 Idaho 459, 235 P.3d 409 (2010). 
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h is Ms l\ loskios' p1Jsit ion tha t, whil e the ruling was e-orrect, ceriain evidence 
was admitted duri ng the tria l \\ hich was ru led impe,nn.i;siblc per that n tl tng. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts by the appell ants in the case which was expressly prohibited 
by the Judge's ruling was admitted, such as During the direct examinat ion of detective 
Berrier by the State, beginning on page 150 of the Jury Trial T ranscript, he testifies 
regarding Ms Martindale' s know-ledge of drug dealing activities within their home, 
relating to previous occasions \ hen individuals \Vould come to the residence, stay for a 
sho11 period of time, and then leave. Th. s i~ evidence not directly relating to the intent to 
possess the marijuana on December 101.r', L009, as alleged, but to th defendant's 
k.no1vledge of previous drug dealing activities, which the court had ru led impermissible 
and prejudiciaL On redirect.. the State again questions Oflicer Barrier, this t ime more 
directly, about the defendant ' s kno wledge of drug act ivity (one should point out this 
occurs after the State has renev,;ed its motion to admit e ·idence pursu ant to I R.E 404 
(b}, alleging that the defense had opened the door upon cross to th is issue, and that motion 
being denied) b_ ask ing whether people going to a bedroom and stayi ng for shoii periods 
of time is consistent ,\ri th sales of marijuana. (See Jury Trial Transcript, page 200 ) 
Throughout the direct examina tion by the State of Robert Tomlinson, the 
questioning refers to the relationship of the two primary drug dealers, ~vtr Tomlinson, and 
Carlos Pintos, the boyfriend of Ms. Moskios. The questions relate to the frequency and 
nature of drug transactions between the tv,·o, which the appell. ant would argue is not 
relevant to the elements of the offen~e charged, since neither of rhem were on trial for 
their drug activities at the time, and the only possible relevance ,vas that which was 
addressed and prohibited by the evidence ruled and prohibited by I.RE 404 (b ): That 
6 
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these fou r individuals had a consi:;ten t ,111d ongoing drng- dealing relationship, and that 
therefore the two co-cl efendallts on trial ,1l the time. , 1s . i\'loskios and 1\1s. l\ Iartindale 
must. have had kno\iv!edge of it. (See Jury trial transcript. pages 220-243 .) 
During the cro:s-e .amination of Carlo:; Pinto by the State (See Jury Trial 
Transcript , page 383-4 JO ). Mr Pinto was questioned on e nature of his ongoing drug -
sales (all of which was also outside the scope of the dire ·t examination by tie defense 
counsel, see below), the lifestyle he led up m those proceeds, including the amount earned 
and the assets owned off of drug ales The counsel for the defense would argue that this 
is all in direct vio ation of the order by the coun regarding impermissible I.RE 404 (b) 
evidence The Judge specifically stated his ruiing was pertinent to the previous possession 
and profits from the drugs in the past. (See id. at 6 7 ) Furthennore, the questioning on 
cross- examination ent into the issue of whether or not I ls. foskios had knowledge of 
the extent of Mr. Pinto' s marijuana grow operations. (See le( at 387-3 88.) The attorney 
for the State even asks him di rectly whether or not Ms Moskios had knowledge of the 
rnarijuana dealing. (Id ) The cross- examination al so heavily deals with questioning into 
the iifestyle and assets and the price of those assets. The only possible relevance to this is 
to show the extent of the drng dealing that had been occurring and JV1s. IV!oskios' iikely 
knowledge of it and profit from it, all of which is in direct violation of the ruling of the 
court, and is highly prejudicial. 
The counsel for the defendant objects when Mr. Pinto is cross- examined as to 
whether Ms. Moskios had traveled before with rnarijuana in the car, for the reasons that 
such questioning is outside the sccµe cf direct- examinatiori Rnd that it is irrelevant to the 
present charge. (See Id; at 408 ) The c-Jrni over-mles the objection, as the State suggests 
I 
I 
I 
it is being offered for impeachment pu rposes, as during direct exmrJ nation he stated Ms. 
I\.loskios couldn · t bel ie, c li e haJ tra veled v, ith drug:: in the car with her there (Jd ) The 
entire line of questioning that continues is \\ith regard to Jld s. ~foskios ' past knowledge of 
the drug opernt.ions, which does not appear to be offered for impeachment purposes. (lei, 
at 412- '-113 ) This entire questioning is highly prejudicial , and for the reasons it was held 
impermissi ble due to I R E 404 (b), it ought to have been excluded. The questions 
regarding Ms. Moskios' pa st knowiedge of drug activities, such as, ·' She knew that you 
hrr'l j (• .h1 ·Y>,:, s·1·J·uan° rl o···n t ·Bo1·c:e n·ght')" ( Tei ·at 4 1? lt.ne 6) ct'o r1·ot 0 nnear to l)p 1·n t~.,.u,_t51...,l 1. !nl ... .c<-t ---i \\l_, 1... . ~}- , :;,_, .. "" : \·'· · _, .... , • _ i . c...1Jt-' ... u ...., ~-
impeachment of any statements by the witness, and therefore ought to have been excluded. 
1L Jhe questio nin2. UQOn cross- examination of Mr Pinto by the State 
was outside the scope of the direct examination, and therefore ou2:ht 
to ha ve been excluded. 
Upon direct examination of Mr. Carlos Pinto, the questions the ,;vitness was asked 
were limited to the specific eve-nts in question as alleged in the complaint Hmvever, upon 
cross- examination. the counsel fo r rhe State questions the 1vitness as to his activities prior 
to December 10 .. 2009, including where be v'/aS v,rork:ng (Id,, at 383, line 18) and the 
defense counsel objects that this is outside the scope of direct. This objection is overruled 
and the line of questio ning thus proceeds. (See id at 3 84.) 
l. R E. 6 J l (b) provides, ''Cross- examination should be limited to the subject 
matter of the direct examination and to matters affecting the credibility of the witness The 
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on 
direct examination." 
8 
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Ms. Moskios in this appe,ll recognize - ilwt \Vliethcr to allo,, questioning outside 
the scope of direct i:- with in t lk <,ound discretion of the trial judgl\ and will not be 
di sturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion . (See Seate v. 
Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 247 P 3d 204, (20 10), ciling Smte \'. Smith, 117 ldaho 225., 
232, 786 P 2d 11 27., 1134 (1990) The questio n is whether in thi:s case there was an abuse 
of tbat discretion It is the posi tion oftli~ appellant thill there \\ as, in fact, an abuse ofthat 
di cretion in the line of questio ni ng \Vhich was allow ed upon the cross- examination of Mr 
Pinto for the folim,ving reasons: the entire line of questioning which ensued on cross-
exarnination was to matters concerning the prior extent of his drng dealing activities and 
how rnuch of it l\ l s Moskios knew about Therefore, it was for the purpose of entering 
into a scope and territory whicl1 had been prohibiied by the rul ing upon the I. R E. 404(6) 
lt was essentially to elucidc1 te the eztent of her kno , !edge of drug dealing activities and 
the extent of those activities of her husband. While couns have held thar the appropriate 
scope of cross- examination is also to facts connected 'vvith those facts, or to matters 
which can explain, modif)1 or qualify the testimony on direct, (See Stale l ' S'tany , 96 Idaho 
148, 150, 525 P 2d 343, 34:'i (1 974)o in this case the totality of the picture of the cross 
examination was to veer off into painting a picture not of the facts of the day in question 
and to Iv1s. Moskios' participa tion in it, but into their entire liveiihood and the connection 
of iliegal drug sales to it Essentially this witness would have been unable to testify at all as 
to the matters at hand and Ms. Moskios ' participation in it that day ,vithout opening the 
door to the previously prohibited 404 (b) evidence. There Core, in this case, the scope of 
the cross-examination ought to have been limited to the matters connected with the direct 
examination. The State was able to effectively admit statements of the defendant which 
9 
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parse through and understand not just 1 ie facts themselves, but rvrs. Moskios ' relatirmship 
cmd knowledge of those.facts. 
C. Standard qf Revh:!w 
\Vhether a lower court improperly jo: ·1ed offenses is a question of law over ,vhich 
appellate courts exercise free review. State \' Cook 144 fdaho 784.. I 71 P 3d 1282 
(2007) \Vnile an abuse of discretion standard is applied when revie\,ving a denial of a 
motion to sever pursua nt to t C. R. 14, that ru le presurnes joinder is proper in the first 
place When reviewi ng the appropriatene ::: s of initiai j oinder, the Court exerci ses free 
review. Id, citing State 1•. Field , 144 !daho 559, 165 P 3d 273 (2007). 
D Argurnent 
Whether joinder of offenses is proper is determined by 1,,vhat is alleged., not by what 
the proofalleged!y shows Stare 1· Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 171 P 3d 1282 (2007) In this 
case, there was no real nexus of offenses for the two defendants, other than one's 
significant other had sold drugs to the other ' s significant other. /JI of the rest of the facts 
and circumstances w hich the jury had to consider were those surrounding each 
defendant's knowledge and likelihood of dominion and control over the drugs in their 
possession. For Ms. t foskios, it was the quest ion of delivery, and the facts surrounding 
the transportation on that part icular day of the drugs in the vehicle, and whether she could 
have jumped out of the vehicie or should ha,.,e done something to stop the transpo1i. For 
Ms. Martindale, it was the facts of the drngs in her home, which room they were in, when 
they were taken there, and how likely she was to have known about it And then there 
1i 
I 
I 
were the fact s about their lives that came in with rega rd to the history of the respective 
men 's d rng dealing µra.cbces All of thi s only served to blur together and result in 
confosio n., both in d osing arguments and during test imony 
Therefore, un der the standards set forth, JOi ncl er m this case was not proper 
Fu,ihermore, the defendants ' counsel shouid have known t hat by failing to make a motion 
for severance of the cases . prejudice to them would result through confusion of the 
issues., and spillover of the issues 
In past cases, where there is an issue of spillover of issues, ,vhich could result in 
confosion fo the jury, f daho courts have held that an adr 10nishi ng at the t ime the separate 
evidence is introduced and at the time of deliberation, is sufficient ,\'ee State v Fox, 52 
fdaho 474, 16 P 2d 663, Idaho 1932. fn this case, it \VOuld have b en nearly impossible 
to give such ad mo nishing at the time of ti e introduction of separate evidence, as almost all 
test imony could have only been in regard to either one or the other of the defendants, 
since the facts and circumstances did not overlap 
Therfore, it is the position of the oppellant that a nev.r trial is warranted on the basis 
that consolidaiton was in the first place improper; or in the alternative, that a motion to 
sever should have been brought, and that failure to so so resulted in such prejudice to the 
appellant that it rises to the levei of ineffective as~istance of counsel in this case. 
12 
IV The Failure to File for Severance of the Jury Trials Amounts to 
Ineffective Assistance of C unsel as a Deficiencv of representation 
that Prejudiced Ms. M oskios in her trial . 
While the Appellant is avvare tha t it is well established that ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are preferably brought th.rough an applicarion for post-conviction relief 
Ms Moskios believes that in this case the error not to file for severance of the jury tri als 
of the rwo defendants is so frmdamental ::rnd \Vas so severely prejudic ial in her case, that it 
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel and is therefore properly brought on di rect 
appeal (See Stale v. Alle!i .. 123 [d:1 ho 880 .. 882, 853 P 2d 625 , 627 (Ct App 1993 .) 
"To prevail on ineffective assistance of counsei, the appellant must shov, that 
counsel's representation wan deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him." State v 
Pug fey, 128 idaho 168, 911 P ~ d 76 ! , c;ttng Strtckicmd 1· TVa.shington. 466 U S 668. 
104 S. Ct. 2052., 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1 984 ) Therefore, in this case ,ve must loo k at whether 
the attorney' s failure to file fo r a motion to sever fell belmv a standard of reasonableness, 
and the effect this had in prejudicing the defendant at rrial. 
V The District Court Erred by not g1vmg Defendant ' s proposed 
inst1T1ct io 11 number Eleven ( 11 ) 
A. Standard ofRe,,few 
The standard of review for whether a proposed jury instruction is properly given is 
an examination of whether the District Cou rt erred, as a matter of law, in its decision. I.C. 
19-2132 (a) 
B. Analysis. 
The defendants' attorney writes m his Amended Motion for New Trial (See 
Addendum A) that he had objected to the Jury Instructio1 l l which was proposed and 
later adopted by Judge Meehl at triaL, which reads: 
I 
I 
f:NSTRUCTION NO, 11 
A person has possession of something if t he person knows of its presence and has physical 
control of it, or has the power and intention w control it . More than one person can be in 
possession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to 
control it 
The defense had objected to rhis instruction on the basis that it shou!d have 
info rmed the jury that "a person has possession of somet hing if the person knows of its 
presence and has the power and intent to exercise dominion and control O\'er the 
substance'' (See Addendum A) The cou nsel for the dcfen:-c based this request on Idaho 
Court of Appeals case decided in 1997, Stare v Ro::xue11,sld, l 30 tdaho 644, 945 P 2d 
I 390 (Ct App . I 997 ) 
The question of what it meant to be in possession \Vas of crucial importance in this 
case, as noted above, because it was the essentini question that the jury had to determine 
W11ether Ms Moskios or lVfs . . Martindale, respectively, had possession, and a jury 
question which was raised during deiiberation shovvs that they in fact considered this to be 
a determjning factor 
The question tbey presented was, " If a defendant knows that there is marijuana in 
her home and does not remove the marijuana from her car or her home, or rernove herself 
from the car or home in which the marijuana is located, or advise law enforcenient o f the 
m2.rijuana, does that defendant thereby have physical control of the marijuana·1" (See Jury 
Trial transcript, page 523-524 ) One can also tell from this question that they have 
completely subsumed and meshed the two factuai situations of the codefendants as one 
1-l 
correct 
1n 
error 
to fairly 
5 p 147 
case a crucial 
to case 1 i u, as 
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) 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
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standard. While the language has not beL'll speci ti caliy adopted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, as noted in Judge }\1eebl' s memorandum Of inion, it is still that \vhich was given by 
the Appeals Court decision as noted above. A.nd while it may not be necessary in every 
case to include this language in order to properly instruct on the law . in a case such as thi s, 
\1-ihere Ms. \ .foskios · actions, knowledge, percepions, and ability to control her situation 
as the mother in a ·ehicle witb her child were all under ciose scrutiny to make the 
determination as to whether her circumsta nces fi t ac1u a1 or const ru ctive "possession" that 
a clear, accurate and thorough definition of the word \Vas crucial. 
Therefore, should th.is Court find that the definit ion as offered by the defendant 
was an accurate reflection of the law, this case ought to be remanded to the District Court. 
VI The Cumulative Effect of the these errors ' ·arrants a new trial in Ms. 
Vfoskios· case. 
J\As Moskios asserts that. even (f these enors are not deemed to rise to the level of 
prejudicial error \Vhen taken individually, the cumulative impact warrants reversal. "When 
there is an 'accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itseif might be harmless, but 
when aggregated the errors shovv' the absence of a fair trial,' the cumulative error doctrine 
requires a reversal of conviction as the trial has contravened the defendant's right to due 
process." State v Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 568, 199 P 3d 123, 143 (2008) (quoting State v. 
held, 144 Idaho 559, 572-573, 165 P. 3d 273, 286-287 (2007) Ms. Moskios asserts that 
the cumulative effects cf the erro;-s in · s case deprived her of her right to a fair trial. The 
trial \Vas not limited to the facts of v,·hat had occurred in her particular case, but was 
essentially a confusion of issues of four different defendants and their bad acts, where a 
16 
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jury was left to parse through t\vo different lifrstyles , hich entailed varying levels of drug 
dealing and profit , and l\·'ls Moskios' specifi c role ci s to the facts as charged in the 
complaint were lost among it a[L A such, Jvls. Tvioskios asserts that thi s Court should 
1acate her _ju dgment of con viction and sentence and remand this case to the district court 
for forrher proceedings 
Conc!u.-.'ion 
This 1s a case 'Nhere the cumula tive effect of the errors is actually the most 
important reason wh_ Ms Moskios ' case ought to be remanded for a new trial In her 
case_ to determine whether she was guilty of posse sion of the marijuana on December 
1 ou', 2009, the definition f possession, and all of its complexities, w re of crucial 
significance, because that was the crux of the matter In addition, the jury \Vas either to be 
presented with an ellti -e world of four individ uals and their involvement and profit from 
illegal marijuana sales, or it was to be presented with a narrow ievv' of ,.vhat had taken 
place on December 1 ot\ 2009, with regard to Ms. Moskios only To avoid the prejudice 
of the environment she was in, and the environment her friends were in, the facts ought to 
have been limited to those relevant her in ol ement only, and her knoi,vledge and 
dominion and control of the marijucuia thr..t was in her car as she drove on a six hour trip 
frorn Oregon to Ida.ho. 
Dated this4- day orJLJ}: , 2011. 
[7 
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BOISE, ln'\HO 83704-2353 
TELEPHONE 208/344-767l! 
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.'\ttornev for Defendants 
Ti\R/1 M.AJUE MOSKJOS wd 
SA1viAJ~11-I.A JEAN MARTINDJ\LE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAJ--10, IN ,\.:\D FOR '11--IE COL'.c'<TY OF Al)_!\ 
THE STA.TE OF lDAJ---IO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TARA :VU\RJE ;viOSKIOS, and 
SA_,_\1A__.Yf1-I/\. JEAl'--' .MARTll\'D/1 .. LE, 
Co-Defendanis. 
I
I Case ,'\os. CR-Ff __ ~-- 2U09--0U2. 3059 
Ami 
CR-- FT_--2009-(IU23062 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
COMES NOW the above-captioned Defendants, Tara Mane tvfoskios and Samantha Jean 
Martindale, by and through their Attorney of Record, John )degna, who hereby request that, pursuant to 
fda110 Crim111al Rule 34 and Idaho Code Section 19-2406(5), this Honorable f:oun order a New Trial 111 the 
above-capboned CrU11JJ1al Proceeding 
The Defendants respectfully asseit that, 111 addition to rhe reasons articulated m their Motion for 
New Trial (and subsequently filed supportmg Affidavits) tl1at was ongmally filed on June 2, 2010, the 
Defendants are, pursuant to IdaJ10 Code Section 19-2406(5), entitled to a new trial because " . the 
court ... rrusdirected the Jut-Y in a matter of law, or .. erred 111 the decision of any question of law arising 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
PAG E 1 ;vrOSK!OS/i\,[ART f\..\10TO[SM[SS 09-23-10 
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during the course of the trial " 
Specifically, the Defendants assert that die Court's Jury Instruction :\:wnber Eleven (11) concerning 
the defo1icion of "possession" maccur;1telv reflected the law on the subject The Defendants contend that, m 
accordaJJce \Vith controllmg Case Law and Commentary attached to tJ1e rcle\'ant Pattern Jury Instruction, the 
Court's Instruction Number Eleven (11) should haw, at a m1rnmurn, mformed the Jury that "a person has 
possession of something if the person knows of its presence and had the po\ver and intent to exercise 
dommon ml(/ ton,'r1J! over the substance [emphasis added]" S!atr v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 51'.?, 887 P 2d 57 (Ct 
,-\pp 1994) and Slate 1,. Pv1<1!jeuskl, BO Id,1110 M4, 945 P 2d 1390 (Cl App 1997) 
/1.s Counsel for the Defendants argued at trial, it would have been most appropriate to adopt the 
entire commentary foJlmving I.CJ I 403/'i., by instruccing tJ1e Jury that 
"In order to establish possession uf a controlled substance, a defendant need not have actual 
physical possession of the substance; the fS]tate need onlv prove that the [D]efendant had such 
dommion and control over the substance to establisl1 constructive possession. Constructive 
possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus between the accused a.nd the substance ,s 
sufficienrlv proven so ·as to gwc nse to the reasonable inference rhar the accused was not sunpJy a 
byst:J.J1clcr but, rather, had the power a11d intern ro exercise dommion and control over the 
substance." 
A comprehensrve Instruction that discussed the difference between "actual possession" and 
"constructi\·e possession" could also have assisted the Jury 111 mtcrpreting and digesting the State's reference, 
made 111 Closmg Pu:gument, to the term "Constrnctivc Possession". Nonetheless, the Defendants contend 
that, 111 the very least, the Court's Jury Instruction I\:umber Eleven (11) should have included the phrase 
"dommion and control". 
AddicionalJy, the Defendants contend that the, are enticied to a new trial because the Cou11 
U11properly responded to a written guescion ci1at was, dunng the course of deliberations, submitted to the 
Court bv the Jury The Defendants' object.ton to the Court's proposed response to the Jury's question was 
noted at TnaJ. 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
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DATED this __ day of September 2010. 
IOH:.\ A.LECRJ:\ 
-\ttornev for Defendants 
\foskios and :-fartindale 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTJFY that~ on this_ day of September 2010. I caused to be served ,1 
true and correct copy of the foregoing mstrnment, entitled DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, to the following named person m die manner 1nd1cated below: 
c;abnel \:f. l-faws, Esq . 
. '\da County Deputy Prosecutmg 
J\ttornev 
200 \X'. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fa.,: (208) 287-7709 
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')!:PUTY 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS, 
TARA MARIE MOSKIOS and 
SAMANTHA MAR TrN DALE 
Defendant 
Case No. CRFE090023059/CRFE0923062 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Alleged Judicial Misconduct 
This case was tried on May 24, through May 26, 20 l 0. Both defendants were live-in girl 
friends of Brian and Carlos Pinto, two men who have been convicted of the drug trafficking 
(marijuana) incident involved in this trial. The defendant raised the defense that while they knew 
their boyfriends dealt in drugs, they were not involved in the "business" and did not possess the 
drugs in question. After a three day trial, the jury found both defendants guilty of felony 
possession of approximately one pound of marijuana. Defendants have moved for a new trial, 
contending that the court instructed the jury improperly in Instruction No. 11 , giving the Idaho 
Criminal Jury Instruction defining "constructive possession" of i I legal drugs: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence 
and has physical control of it, or has the povver and intention to control it. More 
than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence 
and has the power and intention to control it. 
As a visiting judge, I received a set of instructions prepared by Judge Williamson that had 
been given to counsel. On the first morning of trial, there were no requested jury instructions by 
the defense on the subject of constructive possession on file . The first time the Court knew that the 
defense was contesting the validity of proposed Instruction No. 11 , was at the jury instruction 
conference at the end of the second day of trial. 
Without having time for a complete analysis, the Court decided to give the instruction 
requested by the defense . That was identical to Instruction No. 11 except that to find the 
defendants guilty the jury would have to find that defendants had the "power and intention to 
exercise dominion and control" over the marijuana (emphasis added). 
Sometime during the third da y of trial, I realized that requiring the additional fact of 
dominion would place an unfair burden on the state unless I also admitted at least some 404(b) 
evidence that I earlier ruled should not at all be admitted. At the close of the state 's rebuttal, I held 
a conference with counsel in chambers. At that time, I told counsel that because of the additional 
burden put on the state, I would allow at least some 404(b) evidence if the state wished to do so. 
The state stated that it did so wish. At that time. defense counsel asked the Court if it would stick 
to its earlier ruling excluding all 404(b) evidence if the defe nse withdrew its request to give the 
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"dominion" instruction. I replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, Instruction No. 11 was given to 
the jury. 
The Court finds that there was no judicial misconduct or prejudicial error as to Instruction 
No. 11. Since the time of trial, the Court has come to the conclusion that it was proper to give 
Instruction No. 11, since the Supreme Court has never adopted the " dominion" portion that has 
been adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, CF State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho, 356, 900 P 2d 1367 
(I 995). However, the Court also holds that defense counsel was not coerced into withdrawing his 
request for the "dominion" instruction. Instead, defense counsel conferred with his clients, and as a 
matter of trial tactics determined to keep all 404(b) evidence out by agreeing to the ICJI instruction. 
Alleged Witness Intimidating 
Defendants also claim that the Pinto brothers were ready to testify to the effect that 
defendants did not "possess" the marijuana in this case. They, however, had entered into a plea 
bargain with the state, part of which was to testify "truthfully" at defendants' trial. The state would 
then recommend a reduced sentence. The defense claims that when informed by the Pintos that 
they would testify in favor of defendants, the police and prosecutor called them "liars" and 
threatened to withdraw their agreement to recommend a light three year sentence and recommend 
six years. Because of this "intimidation", the Pintos refused to testify truthfully to facts 
exculpatory to defendants. 
The Court finds that this information was available to defense prior to trial ; and that it did 
not call the Pintos as witnesses on the issues raised in the motion for new trial. Thus, this issue 
again involves trial tactics, not grounds for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
For the reasons stated above, the defendants' motion for new trial is denied on all grounds. 
Counsel for the state is to prepare a proposed order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'1h. 
Dated this r day of December, 20 I 0. 
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